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I. INTRODUCTION
Bankruptcy is seldom a panacea for any party entangled in the pro-
cess. For debtors, bankruptcy is usually a last resort. The financial
probing and disclosure surrounding the process and the humiliation
that may accompany the filing of a petition make bankruptcy an unat-
tractive alternative. For creditors, bankruptcy usually indicates that
serious financial difficulties have overcome the debtor, meaning that
INTEREST IN BANKRUPTCY
the creditor may get little of the money it is owed. Also, the delay that
is a part of bankruptcy is a distressing fact of life for all creditors.1
Creditors may wait years for a bankruptcy to move from petition to
confirmation 2 just to be told that they must wait another ten years to
be paid off under a plan, or worse yet, that they will not be paid at all.
Creditors traditionally have charged interest as compensation for
the delay they face as debtors repay money owed. Therefore, the bur-
den caused by the delay of bankruptcy could be alleviated if creditors
would receive interest on their claims while the bankruptcy is pro-
ceeding. While not generous, the Bankruptcy Code (the "Code") al-
lows a select group of creditors to recover interest for the delay in
receiving payment of a claim.3 The purpose of this comment is to out-
line those delays which are compensable with interest, those creditors
that can collect interest, and how much interest such creditors can ex-
pect to receive.
For purposes of this comment, the bankruptcy process will be di-
vided into three distinct time periods. The first period is the time
before and immediately preceding the bankruptcy.4 This period will
be called the pre-petition period. The time frame from the filing of a
petition until the confirmation of a plan5 will be called the gap period.
Finally, the time after the confirmation of the plan will be called the
post-confirmation period.
II. PRE-PETITION PERIOD
The Code allows a creditor to assert claims for pre-petition inter-
est. To the extent that a creditor has a claim for pre-petition matured
interest, a bankruptcy court will allow interest to be included as a part
of a claim under Section 502 of the Code.6 The amount of pre-petition
interest allowed is that amount which has actually accrued prior to the
1. Chapter 12 cases move rapidly through the bankruptcy court, theoretically in 135
days. See 11 U.S.C-. §§ 1221,1224 (West Supp. 1988). However, it is not uncom-
mon for Chapter 11 cases to be pending in a bankruptcy court for several years.
For creditors with large claims against the debtor, interest costs alone can
amount to thousands of dollars during the pendency of the claim.
2. This paper will focus only on Chapters 11, 12, and 13 of the Bankruptcy Code.
Chapter 7 liquidations and Chapter 9 municipal reorganizations will not be dis-
cussed at any length.
3. See 11 U.S.C. § 506(b) (1985); 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b) (1982); 11 U.S.C.A. § 1225(a)
(West Supp. 1988); 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a) (1982).
4. A bankruptcy is commenced by the filing of a petition with the bankruptcy court.
11 U.S.C. § 301 (1982).
5. Confirmation of the plan refers to court approval of a plan of reorganization or
repayment under Sections 1129, 1225, or 1325.
6. Section 502 allows claims of a creditor for interest except to the extent that the
claim is for unmatured interest. 11 U.S.C. § 502(b)(2) (1985). Claims for matured
interest are, therefore, impliedly allowed.
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filing of the petition.7 For example, a claim on a $1,000 note issued one
day before bankruptcy would be allowed only to the extent of the cash
actually advanced. If the original discount on the note was ten per-
cent, so that the cash advance was $900, then only a $900 claim would
be allowed, not the $1,000 face value of the note.8 If the note was one
year old, the interest component of the note would have to be prorated
and interest would be allowed for the one-year period before the filing
of the petition. 9 In summary, all creditors are allowed to receive ma-
tured pre-petition interest as allowed under an agreement with the
debtor.
III. INTEREST DURING THE GAP PERIOD
A. Section 506(a)-Valuation and Timing
In 1978, Congress passed the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978. A
significant change made by the Code in the former law is the treat-
ment of secured creditors and secured claims under Section 506.10 Un-
like the pre-Code law, Section 506 distinguishes between secured and
unsecured claims rather than between secured and unsecured credi-
tors.11 Subsection (a) of Section 506 provides that an allowed claim of
a creditor secured by a lien on property in which the estate has an
interest, is a secured claim only to the extent of the value of the credi-
tor's interest in the estate's interest in the property. The creditor's
claim is an unsecured claim to the extent that the value of the credi-
tor's interest in the property is less than the amount of the allowed
claim.12 Therefore, Section 506 divides a creditor's claim into two
parts. A creditor has a secured claim to the extent of the value of its
interest in the collateral securing its claim and an unsecured claim for
the balance of the allowed claim.13 For example, if a creditor has an
Article 9 security interest in a combine valued at $10,000 securing an
allowed claim14 of $15,000, the creditor will have a secured claim of
$10,000 and an unsecured claim of $5,000. Such a creditor would be
recognized as being undersecured. If the combine was worth $15,000
and the creditor's allowed claim was $10,000, the creditor would have a
secured claim for $10,000 and would be oversecured.15
7. 3 Bkr. L. Ed. § 21.23 (Law. Coop. 1988).
8. S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 62 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEWS 5787, 5848.
9. Id.
10. 11 U.S.C. § 506 (1985).
11. S. REP. No. 939, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 68 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEWS 5737, 5854; see also Barash v. Public Finance Corp., 658 F.2d 504
(7th Cir. 1981).
12. 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (1985).
13. In re Hall, 752 F.2d 582, 589 (11th Cir. 1985).
14. 11 U.S.C. § 502 (1985) determines what claims will be allowed.
15. The $5,000 difference between the value of the combine and the amount of the
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Bifurcation of claims is important because once a creditor is deter-
mined to have a secured claim, it is entitled to adequate protection;16
and, if the creditor is oversecured, the creditor may be allowed inter-
est during the administration of the case.17
The Section 506 determination of secured status applies to a wide
variety of claims in addition to mortgages and security interests under
Article 9. "Lien" as used in Section 506(a) is defined to mean a
"charge against or interest in property to secure payment of a debt or
performance of an obligation."Is Therefore, the secured status of stat-
utory liens, like judicial and mechanics liens, are within the scope of
Section 506(a).19
When a court determines the creditor's secured status under Sec-
tion 506(a), the collateral securing the claim must be valued "in light
of the purpose of the valuation and of the proposed disposition or use
of such property."20 The value is to be determined on a case-by-case
basis, taking into account the facts and competing interests in each
case.2 1 A Section 506 valuation is binding only for the purposes for
which the determination is made and may change later when other
valuations are required.22
A variety of valuation standards exist and have been used by the
courts. Value does not necessarily imply forced sale or liquidation
value. For example, courts use fair market value, retail value, or go-
ing concern value, especially in Chapter 11, 12, or 13 cases where the
debtor intends to retain the property.23 Even after the standard to be
creditor's claim is called an "equity cushion." 11 U.S.C. § 1111(b) (1982) contains
an important exception to the bifurcation of an allowed claim as secured and un-
secured. Section 1111(b) allows a creditor to opt out of the consequences of Sec-
tion 506(a) and have the entire amount owing to the creditor treated as if it were
a totally secured claim and thereby obtain a benefit of anticipated future in-
creases in the value of the collateral. However, a creditor electing 1111(b) treat-
ment gives up the right to any unsecured claim. Therefore, an inadequately
collateralized secured creditor who otherwise would have a secured claim equal
only to the value of its collateral, will be deemed to have a secured claim equal to
the full amount of its claim, but will be precluded from having any unsecured
deficiency claim. Pachulski, The Cram Down and Valuation Under Chapter 11 of
the Bankruptcy Code, 58 N.C.L. REV. 925, 933 (1980).
16. 11 U.S.C. §§ 361-363 (1985) address the adequate protection of secured claims.
17. See infra notes 37-103 and accompanying text.
18. 11 U.S.C. § 101(31) (1985).
19. In re Burton Church Bldg. Co., 53 Bankr. 704 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1985); In re As-
plund, 21 Bankr. 139 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1982); In re Washington, 6 Bankr. 226
(Bankr. E.D. Va. 1980).
20. 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (1985).
21. In re Frost, 47 Bankr. 961, 963 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1985).
22. In re Crockett, 3 Bankr. 365, 367-68 (Bankr. N.D. M. 1980); 3 Bkr. L. Ed. § 21.252
(Law. Coop. 1988).
23. See ag., In re Robinson Ranch, Inc., 75 Bankr. 606 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1987)(fair
market value used in Chapter 12 rather than liquidation value); In re Fiberglass
1988]
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used is determined, there are often several ways to arrive at different
values using the same standard.2 4 Usually, a court is presented with
several values and/or standards in order to arrive at a reasonable and
fair valuation.
The time when collateral is valued also is important because value
may fluctuate considerably in a short period of time.25 Therefore, a
creditor may have a fully secured claim at one valuation date and be
undersecured six months later.26 However, Section 506 does not spec-
ify the time at which the valuation is to be made. Some courts have
held that the property should be valued as it existed at the time of the
filing of the petition.27 Other courts have held that the collateral
should be valued at or near the hearing date to determine Section 506
secured status.28 In United States v. Booth Tow Services,29 the court
reasoned that the collateral should be valued as of the hearing date
because Section 506(a) provides that the proper time to value the se-
cured status of a creditor is "'in conjunction with [the] hearing on
[the] disposition'" of the property.30 The Booth date is more sensible
because it is based on Section 506. Also, valuation as of the petition
date may be difficult if the case is one or two years-old and the ap-
praisal was not done on the filing date.
Rule 30123' allows any party to protect its interest by filing a mo-
tion to have the secured status of a claim determined. Therefore, valu-
ing the property on the hearing date will reward diligence of a creditor
or debtor. If the collateral is declining in value as of the petition date,
a creditor can file a motion for a Section 506 secured status determina-
tion immediately and thereby maximize the amount of its secured
claim. Conversely, if the collateral is appreciating, the debtor can get
a Section 506 determination of secured status and preserve the in-
creasing value of the asset for other creditors, or the estate. When the
Indus., 74 Bankr. 738 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1987)(going concern value used in Chap-
ter 11 rather than liquidation value).
24. See, e.g., In re Holtz, No. BK84-2434, slip op. at 1 (Bankr. D. Neb. Nov. 18,
1984) (appraisers use market approach, cost approach, and income approach to es-
timate fair market value of farmland).
25. The precipitous drop in values of farmland in Nebraska in the early 1980s illus-
trates how severely some collateral can fluctuate in value.
26. Creditors usually want to have their claim fully secured. This will increase the
probability they will be paid in full under a plan and it entitles the creditor to
adequate protection of its entire interest.
27. See, e.g., Fox v. Peck Iron & Metal Co., 25 Bankr. 674, 697 (Bankr. S.D. Cal.
1982)(no reasoning provided); In re Adams, 2 Bankr. 313, 314 (Bankr. M.D. Fla.
1980)(begging the question by reasoning that petition date is a time when credi-
tor's rights are fixed).
28. In re Klien, 10 Bankr. 657, 661 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1981); In re Jones, 5 Bankr. 736,
739 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1980).
29. 64 Bankr. 539 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1985).
30. Id. at 542 (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (1985)).
31. Bankr. R. 3012 (1983).
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valuation is determined as of the hearing date, no party is forced to
accept an adverse value unless it is remiss. The standard and timing of
the valuation can be very important to creditors with secured claims
because each can determine whether the creditor will get interest in
the gap period.
B. General Prohibition on Interest During the Case
The general rule in bankruptcy is that interest ceases to accrue on
secured and unsecured claims with the filing of the bankruptcy peti-
tion.3 2 Section 502(b)(2) codifies the common law prohibition on the
payment of interest after the case is commenced.33 Interest is prohib-
ited during the gap period because it is seen as a penalty on the debtor
for the delay caused by the proceedings.34
Three exceptions have been developed by courts to allow secured
creditors to get interest on their claim during the gap period.35 Inter-
est has been allowed on claims (1) where the debtor ultimately proves
to be solvent; (2) where the security held by the creditor as collateral
produces income after the filing of the petition; and (3) where the se-
curity is sufficient to pay the interest, as well as the principal amount
of the claim.3 6
C. Section 506(b)-The Joys of Having an Oversecured Claim
Section 506(b) of the Code provides:
To the extent that an allowed secured claim is secured by property the value
of which, after any recovery under subsection (c) of this section, is greater
than the amount of such claim, there shall be allowed to the holder of such
claim, interest on such claim, and any reasonable fees, costs, or charges pro-
vided under the agreement under which such claim arose.37
Section 506(b) has been interpreted to be a codification of the third
exception to the general prohibition against allowing interest during
the gap period.3 8 Simply put, a creditor with an oversecured claim can
recover interest on its claim in the gap period to the extent that the
32. City of New York v. Saper, 336 U.S. 328, 330 (1949); Vanston Bondholders Protec-
tive Comm. v. Green, 329 U.S. 156 (1946); Sexton v. Dreyfus, 219 U.S. 339, 344
(1911).
33. See 11 U.S.C. § 502(b) (1985).
34. Thomas v. Western Car Co., 149 U.S. 95, 116-17 (1893).
35. Stevenson & Consalus, Taxing Authorities, Section 506(b) and the "Curious
Comma," 61 Am. BANKR. L.J. 274, 276 (1987) [hereinafter Curious Comma].
36. In re Boston & Main Corp., 719 F.2d 493, 496 (1st Cir. 1983); In re Walsh Constr.,
Inc., 669 F.2d 1325, 1330 (9th Cir. 1982); In re Kerber Pacldng Co., 276 F.2d 245,
246 (7th Cir. 1960); United States v. Bass, 271 F.2d 129, 130 (9th Cir. 1959); In re
Macomb Trailer Coach, Inc., 200 F.2d 611, 613 (6th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345
U.S. 958 (1953).
37. 11 U.S.C. § 506(b) (1985).
38. Curious Comma, supra note 35, at 278.
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value of the collateral exceeds the amount of the allowed claim.3 9
Consequently, if a combine valued at $15,000 secures a claim of
$10,000, the creditor can recover up to $5,000 in gap period interest
from the equity cushion. While the creditor will be subject to the de-
lay of bankruptcy,40 the delay is more tolerable when the interest
clock is running. Section 506(b) gives oversecured creditors an in-
creasing lien as interest costs increase, with the same priority as the
underlying claim. The allowed secured claim is increased as interest
accrues, and the total amount of the claim is entitled adequate protec-
tion.41 The interest continues to be part of the allowed secured claim
until the principal and interest exceed the value of the collateral.42 At
that point, accruing interest becomes an unsecured claim.
The reality of Section 506(b) is that, if a creditor has an unsecured
claim or undersecured claim, no interest can be recovered during the
gap period. "[T]he undersecured creditor, who has no such [equity]
cushion, falls within the general rule disallowing postpetition
interest."43
Several courts of appeal attempted to provide undersecured credi-
tors with gap period interest despite Section 502(b)(2).44 In In re
American Mariner Industries,45 the Ninth Circuit held that an under-
secured creditor is entitled, as a matter of law, "to compensation for
the delay in enforcing its rights" against its collateral during the pro-
ceedings.46 American Mariner held that monthly interest payments
at a market rate on the liquidation value of the collateral securing the
claim must be made to the undersecured creditors.47 The court based
its decision on Sections 361 and 362 of the Code, stating that the con-
cept of adequate protection required monthly payments to under-
secured creditors. 48
In In re Briggs Transportation Co.,49 the Eighth Circuit found that
Section 502(b) did not preclude compensation to undersecured credi-
39. See supra note 8.
40. It is unlikely that such a creditor can get relief from the automatic stay under
Section 362 where a $5,000 equity cushion exists.
41. In re Bramham, 38 Bankr. 459, 463-64 (Bankr. D. Nev. 1984).
42. United Say. Ass'n v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assoc., 108 S. Ct. 626, 630-31
(1988).
43. Id. at 631 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 502(b)(2) (1985)).
44. See In re Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., 793 F.2d 1380 (5th Cir. 1986), affd,
108 S. Ct. 626 (1988); In re Briggs Transp. Co., 780 F.2d 1339, (8th Cir. 1985);
Grundy Nat'l Bank v. Tandem Mining Corp., 754 F.2d 1436 (4th Cir. 1985); In re
American Mariner Indus., 734 F.2d 426 (9th Cir. 1984).
45. 734 F.2d 426 (9th Cir. 1984).
46. Id. at 435.
47. Id.
48. Section 502(b) was not mentioned in American Mariner.
49. 780 F.2d 1339 (8th Cir. 1985).
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tors for the delays of bankruptcy.5o The court held that the bank-
ruptcy court has the discretion to allow interest payments to
undersecured creditors. The facts of each case, such as the nature of
the collateral, whether it is appreciating or depreciating in value, the
length of the stay, and whether the collateral is being kept free of
statutory liens determine whether an undersecured creditor is enti-
tled to gap period interest.51
The Supreme Court recently addressed the question of whether an
undersecured creditor is entitled to interest during the gap period be-
cause of the delay caused by the automatic stay. In United Savings
Association v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Associates,52 the Court used a
multiple code section analysis to conclude that undersecured creditors
are not entitled to interest payments during the gap period. The
Court first held that undersecured creditors fall within the Section
502(b) prohibition on post-petition interest.5 3 Additionally, the care-
ful wording of Section 506(b) to allow interest only on oversecured
claims was strong evidence against undersecured interest seekers.5 4
Finally, the Court found that the American Mariner rationale based
on Section 362(d)(1) effectively gutted Section 362(d)(2) of meaning.5
Based upon Sections 502, 506, and Timbers, undersecured creditors
clearly are not entitled to obtain interest payments during the gap pe-
riod for the delays caused by the automatic stay.56 However, over-
secured creditors can get interest payments on their claims during the
gap period. Probably.
D. Consensual v. Nonconsensual-Are You a Mortgagee
or a Judgment Creditor?
During the pre-Code development of exceptions to the general pro-
hibition on gap period interest, questions arose as to whether all over-
secured creditors could recover interest. Five courts of appeal held
that pre-Code law did not allow the payment of gap period interest on
oversecured tax claims.57 All courts conceded that oversecured con-
sensual liens were entitled to interest during the gap period, but dis-
50. Id. at 1347.
51. Id. at 1349.
52. 108 S. Ct. 626 (1988).
53. Id. at 631.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 632.
56. That is not to say, however, that undersecured creditors are limited in getting
payments for adequate protection under Sections 361 and 362 if the value of the
collateral is depreciating. Id. at 629-30.
57. See In re Boston & Maine Corp., 719 F.2d 493 (1st Cir. 1983); In re Kerber Packing
Co., 276 F.2d 245 (7th Cir. 1960); United States v. Bass, 271 F.2d 129 (9th Cir. 1959);
United States v. Harrington, 269 F.2d 719 (4th Cir. 1959); United States v. Mighell,
273 F.2d 682 (10th Cir. 1959).
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tinguished nonconsensual liens for purposes of obtaining interest.
The basis for the distinction was that a contractual lien, such as a
mortgage or Article 9 security interest, is a bargained for consensual
undertaking where the parties contemplate the payment of interest.5
Giving gap period interest to oversecured consensual claimholders was
seen as necessary to satisfy the expectations of the parties and to
strike a balance between creditors and debtors.5 9 However, noncon-
sensual oversecured claimholders were denied gap period interest be-
cause those creditors did not bargain for interest. The rationale was
that such creditors never contemplated receiving interest, did not de-
serve interest, and the allowance of interest would penalize lower pri-
ority creditors. 60
Accordingly, there was created a fairly uniform rule that over-
secured consensual claims were allowed to accrue gap period interest,
but oversecured nonconsensual claims were not. Because statutory
liens, including mechanics, fertilizer, tax, and judgment liens, are gen-
erally nonconsensual in nature, the rule can have a significant impact
on those creditors who rely on such liens and the availability of recov-
ering interest on claims secured by nonconsensual liens.61 With the
passage of Section 506(b), courts have again raised the consensual ver-
sus nonconsensual distinction.
E. Section 506(b)-Do I Need a Consensual Lien?
Contrasting decisions have been reached on the question of
whether Section 506(b) allows for recovery of gap period interest on
oversecured nonconsensual claims--claims usually given lien status by
state statute. One line of cases hold that Section 506(b) authorizes the
allowance of gap period interest to all oversecured creditors, regard-
less of whether the creditor's lien is consensual or nonconsensual in
nature.62 However, a nearly equal number of courts have concluded
that gap period interest is not allowed on oversecured nonconsensual
claims.6 3
58. Curious Comma, supra note 35, at 279.
59. In re Boston & Maine Corp., 719 F.2d 493, 497 (1st Cir. 1983).
60. Id.
61. While most statutory liens do not include a specific authorization to recover inter-
est, some do. For example NEB. REV. STAT. § 45-104.01 (1984) and NEB. REV.
STAT. § 77-207 (1986) authorize the State of Nebraska to assess interest at four-
teen percent on delinquent real estate taxes. The question is whether this statu-
tory right is enforceable in bankruptcy.
62. See, e.g., Best Repair Co. v. United States, 789 F.2d 1080 (4th Cir. 1986)(tax lien);
In re Brandenburg, 71 Bankr. 719 (Bankr. D.S.D. 1987)(tax lien); In re Busone, 71
Bankr. 201 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1987)(tax lien); In re Charter Co., 63 Bankr. 568
(Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1986)(mechanic's lien); In re Morrissey, 37 Bankr. 571 (Bankr.
E.D. Va. 1984)(judicial lien); In re Bormes, 14 Bankr. 895 (Bankr. D.S.D. 1981)(ju-
dicial lien).
63. See, e.g., In re Ron Pair Enters., 828 F.2d 367 (6th Cir. 1987)(tax lien); In re New-
[Vol. 67:646
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The Sixth Circuit recently addressed the question of whether Sec-
tion 506(b) authorizes the payment of gap period interest on an over-
secured claim when the claim is nonconsensual in nature in In re Ron
Pair Enterprises.6 4 In Ron Pair, the United States claimed that it was
entitled to gap period interest on oversecured claims for withholding
and social security taxes. The debtor argued that the language of Sec-
tion 506(b) "provided for under the agreement under which such
claim arose," modifies "interest on such claim."65 Therefore, the
debtor argued that Section 506(b) codifies the judicially created pre-
Code rule disallowing interest on nonconsensual claims, because an
agreement did not provide for interest on the tax claims.6 6 The debtor
also asserted that the language of Section 506(b) is too ambiguous to
infer a congressional intent to deviate from the pre-Code rule.6 7
The government claimed that Section 506(b) clearly allowed inter-
est on all oversecured claims because the "phrase 'interest on such
claim' is set off by commas and is followed by the words 'and any,'
indicating that interest is to be treated differently than fees, costs or
charges" under Section 506(b).68 The government proposed that Sec-
tion 506(b) was unambiguous and that pre-Code law was no longer
relevant.
The court held that interest is not authorized for nonconsensual
oversecured claims because Section 506(b) does not clearly overrule
the pre-Code rule.69 The court considered pre-Code law relevant, be-
cause "the language of a statute is always the starting point when its
construction is at issue, [but] it is only the starting point."70 After an
extensive review of the pre-Code law, the court concluded that "the
language of section 506(b), when read in light of the pre-Code judi-
cially created doctrine, codifies the pre-Code law on the issue of allow-
able postpetition interest."71 This conclusion was based on "[t]he
normal rule of statutory construction.., that if Congress intends for
legislation to change the interpretation of a judicially created concept,
it makes that intent specific. The Court has followed this rule with
particular care in construing the scope of bankruptcy codifications."72
bury Cafe, Inc., 72 Bankr. 478 (Bankr. E.D. Mass. 1987)(tax lien); In re Dan-ver
Enters., 67 Bankr. 951 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1986)(judgment lien); In re Churchfield,
62 Bankr. 399 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1986)(tax lien).
64. 828 F.2d 367 (6th Cir. 1987).
65. 11 U.S.C. § 506(b) (1985). For the full text of section 506(b), see text accompany-
ing note 37.
66. In re Ron Pair Enters., 828 F.2d 367, 369.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 368.
70. Id. at 369-70 (citations omitted).
71. Id. at 372.
72. Id. at 370 (quoting Midlantic Nat'1 Bank v. New Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Protection,
474 U.S. 494, 501 (1986)(citations omitted)).
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
While the court never stated that Section 506(b) was ambiguous, the
court did not find Section 506(b) unambiguous enough to change the
pre-Code rule.73
Bankruptcy courts also have found that Section 506(b) does not au-
thorize interest payments on oversecured nonconsensual claims.74
Most of the courts have found that Section 506(b) expressly provides
that interest can only be granted pursuant to an agreement, or that
Section 506(b) is ambiguous and should only be construed to be a codi-
fication of pre-Code law. For example, in In re Newbury Cafe, Inc.,75
the court found the pre-Code rule too strong to be overruled by the
ambiguous Section 506(b), even though the two districts in Massachu-
setts now have different constructions of Section 506(b).76
Commentators also have agreed that Section 506(b) is too ambigu-
ous to change the pre-Code rule.77 Collier states that, even if a credi-
tor is oversecured, without a contractual agreement, post-petition
interest is not allowable under Section 506(b).78 Collier also explains
that the comma placement in Section 506(b) was not to allow interest
on nonconsensual claims, but to prevent a reading where interest not
only would be allowed on the underlying claim, but also on fees, costs,
and charges.79
F. All Oversecured Claims Get Interest in Some Courts
While many courts read Section 506(b) to codify the pre-Code rule
that gap period interest is not allowed on oversecured nonconsensual
claims, substantial authority exists to support a claim for such inter-
est.8 0 In In re Best Repair Co.,81 the United States was once again try-
ing to get gap period interest on an oversecured tax claim. The Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals found that the plain and natural reading of
the statute allowed gap period interest under Section 506(b). The
court found that the placement of the comma was intended to separate
the ability to get gap period interest on a claim, from any requirement
73. In fact, the court stated that pre-Code law should be used to show that the Code is
ambiguous. Id. at 373.
74. See, e.g., In re Dan-ver Enters., 67 Bankr. 951 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1986)(judgment
lien); In re Venable, 48 Bankr. 853 (S.D. N.Y. 1985)(tax lien).
75. 72 Bankr. 478 (Bankr. E.D. Mass. 1987)(tax claim).
76. The court in In re Russo, 63 Bankr. 335 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1986)(now the western
district bankruptcy court) allowed interest on oversecured nonconsensual claims.
77. See Curious Comma, supra note 35, at 284-86. For a discussion that at least pre-
petition tax claims secured by a valid tax lien are not entitled to gap period inter-
est, see Bancroft, Postpetition Interest on Tax Liens in Bankruptcy Proceedings,
62 AM. BANKR. L.J. 327 (1988).
78. COLLIER, COLLIER ON BANKRUPTcY 506.05, at 506-41 (15th ed. 1988).
79. Id. at 506-43.
80. See supra note 63.
81. 789 F.2d 1080 (4th Cir. 1986).
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that there be an agreement providing for interest.8 2 While the Best
Repair court ignored the pre-Code rule, another bench of the Fourth
Circuit has interpreted Best Repair to find that Section 506(b) made a
change in the pre-Code substantive law.8 3
Bankruptcy courts also have supported the result reached in Best
Repair for a variety of nonconsensual claims.8 4 The issue has been
limited to the circuit, district, and bankruptcy courts. The Supreme
Court has not yet clarified the divided construction of Section 506(b).
In United Savings Association v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Associ-
ates,8 5 on an unrelated issue, the Court stated, without qualification,
that oversecured creditors are entitled to interest under Section 506(b)
to the extent of the "security cushion."8 6 However, the Court also
stated that Section 506(b) merely codified pre-Code law which denied
undersecured creditors gap period interest.8 7 Therefore, it is difficult
to predict whether the Court would allow gap period interest to all
oversecured creditors or whether it would find the pre-Code law con-
trolling. Due to the split that currently exists in the lower federal
courts, the Supreme Court may give a definitive answer soon.
G. How Much Interest Does Section 506 Allow?
Assuming that a creditor has an oversecured consensual lien or an
oversecured nonconsensual lien in a jurisdiction which follows the
Best Repair result, how much interest can the creditor get? The an-
swer varies; a contract, market, or statutory rate is most likely applied.
Generally, gap period interest "should be computed at the rate pro-
vided in the agreement under which the claim arose, the so-called
'contract rate' of interest."88 Where there is a contract, like a note
secured by a mortgage or an Article 9 security interest, courts ordina-
rily will allow gap period interest at the rate on the face of the note.8 9
Judge Mahoney of the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Nebraska
utilizes that rate when available.9 0 The courts using the contract rate
give little rationale for doing so. If a court agrees with the Ron Pair
reading of Section 506(b), that "provided for under the agreement
under which such claim arose" modifies "interest on such claim," then
82. Id. at 1082.
83. Mack Fin. Corp. v. Ireson, 789 F.2d 1083 (4th Cir. 1986).
84. See supra note 62. These courts have found that the statute plainly authorizes
gap period interest to all oversecured creditors.
85. 108 S. Ct. 626 (1988).
86. Id. at 631.
87. Id.
88. COLLIER, COLLIER ON BANKRuPTcY 506.05, at 506-43 (15th ed. 1988).
89. In re Lenz, 74 Bankr. 413, 416 (Bankr. C.D. IM. 1987); In re Maihnone, 41 Bankr.
974,979 (Bankr. D. N.J. 1984); In re Loveridge Machine & Tool Co., 36 Bankr. 159,
161 (Bankr. D. Utah 1983).
90. In re Schmit, No. BK87-1278, slip op. at 1 (Bankr. D. Neb. Sep. 28, 1987).
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use of the contract rate is sound reasoning. Also, a court may be giv-
ing the debtor and creditor the benefit of their bargain.
If the court agrees with Best Repair, the contract might not deter-
mine which rate is chosen under Section 506(b). For example, in In re
Laza,91 an oversecured creditor sought a contract interest rate of six-
teen percent during the gap period. The court held, however, that
Section 506(b) did not require the contract rate and awarded the credi-
tor an eight percent rate, based on current money market opportuni-
ties.92 The court agreed that "'interest on such claim'. . ., is
independent of the modifying clause 'provided under the agreement"'
in Section 506(b).93 Therefore, rather than binding the court to accept
the contract rate, the court held that Section 506(b) authorized a case-
by-case determination of a market rate of interest which could be
awarded as the gap period interest rate.94
At least one court has adopted a case-by-case approach to deter-
mine a Section 506(b) interest rate where two contract rates exist. In
In re W.S. Sheppley & Co.,95 the contract provided for a default rate of
interest of twelve percent and a normal, no-default rate of 9.27 per-
cent. An oversecured creditor sought the twelve percent rate under
Section 506(b), because the debtor had defaulted on the note.96 The
court concluded that the creditor was entitled only to the lower no-
default contract rate.97 The court used the pre-Code law to create a
flexible approach in determining what contract rate to adopt. The
court concluded that the lower contract rate should apply for the fol-
lowing reasons: (1) the creditor faced no realistic risk of non-payment
of its debt; (2) the lower contract rate was near the market rate; and
(3) the increased rate was not justified by an increased risk to the
creditor. 98
Where the oversecured creditor is a nonconsensual creditor (no
contract exists) and is in a jurisdiction that allows gap period interest,
courts generally award such creditors some statutory rate of inter-
est.99 For example, in In re Busone,lOo the court held that a county's
oversecured tax claim for property taxes was entitled to the interest
91. 69 Bankr. 669 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1987).
92. Id. at 671.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. 62 Bankr. 271 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1986).
96. Id. at 272.
97. Id. at 278-79.
98. Id. at 278.
99. See In re Busone, 71 Bankr. 201 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1987)(judgment creditor gets
rate of twelve percent); In re Charter Co., 63 Bankr. 568 (Bankr. M.D. Fla.
1986) (mechanic's lien creditor gets statutory rate).
100. 71 Bankr. 201 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1987).
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rate contained in the statute creating the lien.101 Under the Busone
reasoning, the State of Nebraska may be able to recover fourteen per-
cent interest' 02 on its oversecured real estate tax claims, assuming
that the Nebraska bankruptcy courts allow gap period interest on
oversecured nonconsensual liens.103
The courts have been faithful to the use of statutory rates in the
absence of a contract rate. However, statutory rates are relatively un-
responsive to fluctuations in market rates.104 If the statutory rate is
significantly higher than the market rate, a court might adopt the
case-by-case analysis of Sheppley in order to use the lower market
rate. This result would be more equitable to lower priority creditors,
while still allowing the secured creditor to receive a competitive inter-
est rate during the gap period.
H. Summary
Creditors can recover interest on their claims during the gap pe-
riod of a bankruptcy as outlined below:
(1) Unsecured and undersecured creditors are not entitled to in-
terest payments on their claims during the gap period.
(2) Oversecured consensual claim creditors are entitled to inter-
est under Section 506(b) on their claims. This group of creditors in-
cludes valid mortgagees, Article 9 security holders, and other
contractural creditors.
(3) Oversecured nonconsensual lien creditors may be entitled to
interest, depending upon the jurisdiction in which the case is pending.
Not all courts allow interest under Section 506(b) on these claims.
This group of creditors generally consists of statutory lienholders.
(4) The rate of interest allowed is generally the specified contract
rate. Where no contract exists, courts often use the state statutory
rate of interest. A few courts have used a case-by-case analysis and
awarded a market rate of interest.
IV. POST-CONFIRMATION INTEREST
The final period in which creditors can seek interest payments on
their claims is the post-confirmation period. Sections 1129,105 1225,106
and 1325107 allow debtors to get a plan of reorganization or rehabilita-
101. Id. at 204.
102. See supra note 61. NEB. REV. STAT. § 45-103 (1984) also gives judgment creditors
the right to collect fourteen percent interest on their claim.
103. The Nebraska courts have not yet addressed the question.
104. Nebraska's rate is adjustable, but the current rate was last changed in 1981. NEB.
REV. STAT. § 45-101.01 (1984).
105. 11 U.S.C. § 1129 (1982).
106. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1225 (West Supp. 1988).
107. 11 U.S.C. § 1325 (1982).
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tion confirmed under Chapters 11, 12, and 13, respectively.10s Plans
generally provide for the payment of secured claims over some period
of time after confirmation of the plan. Creditors are entitled to have
interest added to the future stream of payments in order to realize the
present value of their claim. This section discusses the various meth-
ods used by courts to determine the appropriate interest rate to be
applied to the future payment stream. Particular attention will be
given to the recent decisions in the Eighth Circuit.
Chapters 11, 12, and 13 give a bankruptcy court the power to con-
firm a plan of reorganization over the objections of creditors-the
power to "cram down" a plan. Code Sections 1129, 1225, and 1325 set
out the requirements that the plan must meet in order to be con-
firmed. Section 1129 allows a plan to be crammed down, in part, if the
secured creditor will receive "deferred cash payments totaling at least
the allowed amount of such claim, of a value, as of the effective date of
the plan, of at least the value of such holder's interest in the estate's
interest in such property."109 The legislative history to Section 1129
explains that Congress included this language in order to "recogniz[e]
the time value of money" by requiring "a present value analysis that
will discount value to be received in the future."110 Courts agree that
this cram down provision requires debtors to add interest to their pro-
posed plan payments at a rate equal to the present value discount rate
so that the present value of the future stream of payments equals the
creditor's allowed secured claim.111 The question here is what interest
rate needs to be used to allow the creditor to realize the present value
of its claim. For example, suppose a creditor has a secured claim of
$36,000 and objects to confirmation of a plan. The debtor attempts to
cram down the plan under Section 1129(b)(2)(A)(i) by making three
years of monthly payments to the creditor. Payments of $1,000 per
month will not allow the creditor to realize the present value of its
claim.112 The debtor must add some interest, based upon an adequate
discount rate, to give the creditor its present value and to meet the
cram down test.
Chapters 12 and 13 contain similar confirmation requirements re-
garding the addition of interest to deferred payments of secured
108. In Chapter 7, property of the estate is liquidated and creditors are paid, without a
plan of reorganization being proposed or confirmed. Chapter 9 provides for con-
firmation of a plan under section 1129, pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 901 (1982). How-
ever, Chapter 9 will not be discussed explicitly.
109. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(i)(II) (1982).
110. S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 413-14 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 6369-70.
111. See Carbiener, Present Value in Bankruptcy: The Search for an Appropriate
Cramdown Discount Rate, 32 S.D.L. REV. 42 n.7, 45 (1987).
112. If this point is not clear, see Carbiener, supra note 111, at 43-44.
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claims.113 Courts have recognized that the substantive requirements
for payment of interest on deferred payments under a plan are the
same for Chapters 11, 12, and 13, even though the confirmation lan-
guage differs slightly.- 4 The legislative history supports this
conclusion.11s
Section 506(b) only applies to the question of receiving interest in
the gap period and has no application to the post-confirmation pe-
riod.316 While courts occasionally apply Section 506(b) incorrectly to
the post-confirmation interest rate determination,117 most courts rec-
ognize that Section 506(b) applies only to determine whether a credi-
tor is entitled to interest in the gap period.118
Sections 1129, 1225, and 1325 require that interest be paid on all
"secured claims" under a crammed down plan.119 The bankruptcy
court must determine the amount to be paid on a secured claim "as of
the effective date of the plan."' 20 The Code does not define "effective
date." However, the date is important because that date will be used
to determine what discount or interest rate will be applied to the de-
ferred stream of payments on the secured claim. If interest rates are
volatile, the interest rate paid under a plan can vary depending upon
the date that is chosen.
One commentator has suggested that the effective date of a plan
usually be the first day after which the order of confirmation becomes
final, which under Bankruptcy Rule 8002, would be eleven days after
the entry of the order of confirmation if there is no appeal.' 21 How-
ever, setting the effective date when the confirmation order becomes
final has been criticized on the ground that it would then be impossi-
113. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1225(a)(5)(B)(ii) (West Supp. 1988) requires that a plan provide to
secured creditors "the value, as of the effective date of the plan, of property to be
distributed ... is not less than the allowed amount of such claim." Chapter 13
incorporates this same requirement under 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii) (1982).
14. See In re Milleson, 83 Bankr. 696 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1988)(same standard for Chap-
ters 11 and 12); In re Doud, 75 Bankr. 865 (Bankr. S.D. Iowa 1987)(same standard
for Chapters 12 and 13); In re Edwardson, 74 Bankr. 831 (Bankr. D.N.D.
1987)(same standard for Chapters 11 and 12).
115. S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 408 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADum. NEws 6364.
116. COLLIER, COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 506.05, at 506-44 to -47 (15th ed. 1988).
117. See In re KCC-Leawood Corporate Manor I, No. 88-00346-3-U (Bankr. W.D.. Mo.
Nov. 2,1988); In re C & P Gray Farmers, Inc., 70 Bankr. 704 (Bankr. W.D. Mo.
1987); In re Marx, 11 Bankr. 819 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1981).
118. See In re Laza, 69 Bankr. 669 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1987); In re Hyden, 10 Bankr. 21
(Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1980).
119. Section 1129(a)(9) also requires that interest payments be included in deferred
payments of certain administrative expense claims allowed under § 507.
120. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(i)(II) (1982), 11 U.S.C.A. § 1225(a)(5)(B)(ii) (West
Supp. 1988); 11 U.S.C. § 1325 (a)(5)(B)(ii) (1982).
121. Klee, All You Ever Wanted to Know About Cram Down Under the New Bank-
ruptcy Code, 53 AM. BANKR. L.J. 133, 137 n.24 (1979).
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ble to make the present value valuations, because the likelihood of an
appeal and the date when the appeal will be resolved cannot be deter-
mined in advance of confirmation.1 22
Nebraska Bankruptcy Judge Minahan recently decided that, for
purposes of Section 1225, "effective date" means the date on which a
Chapter 12 plan becomes binding on the debtor and other parties in
interest under Section 1227.123 In general, the "effective date" will be
the date the confirmation order is entered. Therefore, the discount
rate will be determined as of the confirmation order date. Other
courts agree that the "effective date" should be on or near the confir-
mation date.12A Sections 1141 and 1327 bind the parties in Chapters 11
and 13 as Section 1227 does in Chapter 12, so that, under Judge
Minahan's reasoning, one would predict the date of the confirmation
order to be the "effective date" in Chapter 11 and 13 cases, also.
The interest rate used to ensure that creditors receive the present
value through a deferred payment schedule is important to debtors
and creditors. The rate may determine whether a plan is feasible and
whether a creditor will accept or reject the proposed plan. 2 5 How-
ever, no uniform method to determine a rate exists, and bankruptcy
courts within the same circuit often disagree on how to apply court of
appeals' opinions on the issue.
A. Methods Used to Calculate Interest Rates
in Post-Confirmation Period
Because reorganization plans are often objected to by creditors,
courts do need to cram down plans in such a manner that a discount
rate needs to be determined for deferred payments of secured claims.
Courts agree that few issues under the Code have produced so many
opinions with such varied results as the issue of the appropriate inter-
est rate for determining present value. One commentator recently
classified the methods of calculating the post-confirmation interest
rate into eight categories: (1) the legal or judgment rate; (2) a rate
established by expert testimony; (3) a rate established by averaging or
using other arbitrary methods; (4) a contract rate; (5) the current mar-
ket rate for similar loans; (6) the Internal Revenue Service judgment
rate set by 26 U.S.C. Section 6621; (7) the rate the creditor must pay to
replace the funds; and (8) the federal civil judgment rate set by 18
U.S.C. Section 1961, with or without an additional interest pre-
122. Pachulski, supra note 15, at 934 n.40.
123. In re Milleson, 83 Bankr. 696, 699 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1988).
124. See In re E Bar V Angus Ranch Co., No. BK87-801, slip op. at I (Bankr. D. Neb.
Nov. 9,1987)(Chapter 12); In re Jones, 32 Bankr. 951 (Bankr. D. Utah 1983)(Chap-
ter 11).
125. Carbiener, supra note 111, at 43.
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mium.126 After an excellent summary of the case law using each
method, the author concluded:
(1) Three early courts used the statutory judgment rate of the state with
jurisdiction over the case as the discount rate; one because it was convenient,
one through a confession of judgment fiction and one because it was a rate
designed to compensate creditors for the deprivation of a possessory interest
in property.
(2) Many courts have cited the absence of evidence on alternative rates when
setting the discount rate, but only a few have actually based their choice of a
discount rate on expert testimony.
(3) Several courts have rejected contract rates because they inappropriately
include profit and, instead, they have used either an arbitrary rate... or some
type of averaged rate as the discount rate.
(4) Many courts have set the discount rate equal to the contract rate based
on either a misreading of congressional intent, an arbitrary determination that
the contract rate was fair, or a finding that the contract rate was the best of
several imperfect alternatives.
(5) One line of cases... [used] the rate currently being charge on the type of
obligation which forms the basis of the creditor's claim or the rate currently
being charged on the type of obligation the creditor is being forced to enter
into under the plan.
(6) The rate set by 26 U.S.C. Section 6621 has been used as the discount rate
by several courts because it was responsive to economic conditions, periodi-
cally revised, and not an unfair burden to debtors.
(7) Several courts focus on compensating the creditor for the delay in receiv-
ing payment by setting the discount rate equal to the creditor's cost of borrow-
ing, usually the rate on government securities plus one-half percent.
(8) Many courts have chosen the rate set by the most recent auction of fifty-
two week treasury bills as the discount rate because: it is responsive to cur-
rent economic conditions as it adjusts every four weeks; it is easy to calculate;
it is the risk free cost of money stripped of profit and other elements not ap-
propriate in bankruptcy;, and, if an additional premium is necessary, the fifty-
two week treasury bill is the appropriate base upon which to build.12 7
B. Eighth Circuit Cases on the Discount Rate
The Eighth Circuit has been somewhat of a leader among the
courts of appeals in addressing the issue of an appropriate discount
rate, with two of the six circuit opinions discussing the topic. 2 8 The
following is an examination of the Eighth Circuit cases, at the appel-
late and bankruptcy court levels. The bankruptcy courts have come to
different results on how to determine an appropriate discount rate.
In In re Monnier Bros.,129 the debtor appealed a district court deci-
126. Id. at 45.
127. Id. at 57-58 (footnotes omitted).
128. The courts of appeals' opinions are: United States v. Nel Pharmacal Co., 789 F.2d
1283 (8th Cir. 1986); In re Colgrove, 771 F.2d 119 (6th Cir. 1985); In re Monnier
Bros., 775 F.2d 1336 (8th Cir. 1985); In re Burgess Wholesale Mfg. Opticians, Inc.,
721 F.2d 1146 (7th Cir. 1983); In re Southern States Motor Inn, Inc., 709 F.2d 647
(11th Cir. 1983), cert denied, 465 U.S. 1022 (1984); Memphis Bank & Trust Co. v.
Whitman, 692 F.2d 427 (6th Cir. 1982).
129. 755 F.2d 1336 (8th Cir. 1985).
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sion setting the cram down rate at the contract rate of thirteen per-
cent, rather than a treasury bill yield of 10.5 percent. The debtor
argued that some market rate should be used under the plan. The
debtor provided the bankruptcy court with a page from the Wall
Street Journal and asked the court to pick an interest rate to serve as
the discount rate.130 The concerned creditor wanted the contract rate
as compensation for impairment of its right to foreclose and to give the
creditor the benefit of its bargain.131 The court stated:
The appropriate discount rate must be determined on the basis of the rate of
interest which is reasonable in light of the risks involved. Thus, in determin-
ing the discount rate, the court must consider the prevailing market rate for a
loan of the term equal to the payout period, with due consideration for the
quality of the security and the risk of his subsequent default. 1 32
The court went on to affirm the district court's use of the contract rate
as the appropriate discount rate. 33 However, the facts of the case
seem to limit the use of the contract rate on any general basis. The
court approved a contract rate, in part, because the contract: (1) was
negotiated a short time before the bankruptcy; and (2) like the plan,
contemplated a fifteen-year payment term. Therefore, the court
seemed to think that the contract rate was equivalent to the market
rate and appropriate as a discount rate. Additionally, the court cited
the failure of either party to offer much evidence on the market inter-
est rate as support for use of the contract rate. 3 4 While the court did
not say that an evidentiary hearing must be held to determine the dis-
count rate, it did appear to encourage the practice.
In United States v. Neil Pharmacal Co.,135 the Eighth Circuit ad-
dressed the question of what rate of interest on deferred payments of
delinquent federal taxes would provide the United States with the
present value of its claim, as required under Section l129(a)(9). 3 6
The debtor's plan proposed to pay the government quarterly interest
at the rate paid on thirteen-week treasury bills at the time of each
quarterly payment. The government argued that it was entitled to the
rate of interest set under 26 U.S.C. Section 6621, the statutory rate for
delinquent taxes.137
130. Id. at 1339.
131. Id. at 1338.
132. Id. at 1339 (quoting 5 COLLRE, COLLIER ON BANRuprcy 1129.03, at 1129-65).
133. Id. at 1339.
134. Id.
135. 789 F.2d 1283 (8th Cir. 1986).
136. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(9) (1982) requires that holders of certain administrative ex-
pense claims receive the present value of their claim when paid on a deferred
basis under the plan. This requirement is the same as that owed to holders of
secured claims under § 1129(b)(2). The government held an administrative claim
under § 507(a)(1).
137. The interest rate under section 6621 was an average of the prime rate quoted by
commercial banks to large businesses, at the time of the case. 26 U.S.C. § 6621
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The court reaffirmed the position it took in Monnier that the inter-
est rate used must be a prevailing market rate which is reasonable in
light of the risks involved. 38 The court of appeals rejected the
debtor's proposal that only the government's cost of borrowing money
(the T-bond rate) should determine the discount rate. The court
stated that the risk of repayment, the length of the repayment period,
and the existence of collateral must also be considered.139
The court also rejected Section 6621 as the appropriate measure
because that rate lags behind the market rate' 40 and does not consider
the length of the repayment period and the risk of default under the
plan.141 Finally, the court disapproved of the application of a uniform
rate and stressed that the rate should be determined "on a case-by-
case basis."142 The court remanded the case for a hearing on the pre-
vailing market rate of interest.
Based upon Monnier and Neil Pharmacal, the appropriate discount
rate must be:
(1) A prevailing market rate;
(2) For a loan of a term equal to the plan payout period;
(3) With due consideration to the existence and quality of secur-
ity, and the risk of subsequent default; and
(4) Determined on a case-by-case basis.
C. Lower Courts in the Eighth Circuit
1. Iowa
Bankruptcy Judge Jackwig of the Southern District of Iowa has
tried to add some certainty and convenience to the determination of
the appropriate discount rate. In In re Doud,143 his court considered
how the appropriate cram down rate was to be determined in a Chap-
ter 12 plan. The debtors proposed to pay the FmHA an interest rate of
6.5 percent (the T-bond rate plus one percent) on its secured claim.144
(1982). Section 6621 was amended so that the interest rate is now based on short-
term T-bils plus three percentage points. 26 U.S.C. § 6621 (1986).
138. United States v. Neil Pharmacal Co., 789 F.2d 1283, 1285-86.
139. Id. at 1286. The court found that the T-bill rate alone would not provide the
government with the present value of its claim. Id.
140. The lag should be less pronounced since, under the amended section 6621, the
rate is recalculated every quarter. 26 U.S.C. § 6621 (1986).
141. United States v. Neil Pharmacal Co., 789 F.2d 1283, 1288. While the Eighth Cir-
cuit implied that the section 6621 rate might, therefore, be too low, one commen-
tator also attacked the rate for being too high since it includes a 'punitive factor"
to deter tax evasion. Carbiener, supra note 111, at 59 n.173. This observation is
strengthened by the 1986 amendments to section 6621 which add a three percent
factor to the T-bill rate.
142. United States v. Neil Pharmacal Co., 789 F.2d 1283, 1289.
143. 74 Bankr. 865 (Bankr. S.D. Iowa 1987).
144. Id. at 866.
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The FmHA argued that it was entitled to a "market rate" under Mon-
nier and Neil Pharmacal.145 The court agreed that the discount rate
must be a market rate-consisting of a riskless rate plus a risk factor
to account for the risk of a Chapter 12 reorganization. 4 6 The court
concluded that the discount rate in a Chapter 12 would be determined
by using the yield on a treasury bond with a remaining maturity
matched to the average amount outstanding during the term of the
allowed claim, plus a two percent upward adjustment to account for
the risk that a creditor must bear under the reorganization.147 This
approach basically requires the attorneys of the interested parties to
bring the Wall Street Journal to the confirmation hearing to locate
the right T-bond rate and add two percent.148 Judge Jackwig will use
the rate yielded by this method in all discount rate determinations,
unless unusual circumstances justify departure from the
calculation.149
The Iowa bankruptcy courts have expanded the use of the Doud
method to calculate the interest rate on deferred payments under a
plan. For example, in In re Moore,'50 the court adopted the method to
calculate the appropriate rate of interest on an administrative expense
under Section 1129(a)(9). 151 However, a 2.5 percent risk factor was
added, rather than two percent, because the risks faced by the creditor
were greater than those in Doud.152 The court in In re Noe' 53 adopted
the Doud formula as a basic, easy way to calculate an interest rate that
145. Id. at 867.
146. Id. at 868-69. Those risks include the unpredictable nature of the agricultural
economy due to factors such as weather, the value of the dollar, foreign produc-
tion and government policy, and the severity of the agricultural downturn. Id.
147. Id. at 869-70.
148. The rate is the rate of a T-bond with the equal maturity to the average amount of
the secured claim outstanding during the repayment period under the plan. For
example, where a debtor proposes to pay a $10,000 claim over ten years with equal
yearly payments, the average outstanding balance of the claim is $5,500. There-
fore, fifty-five percent of the claim is outstanding over the payment period.
(5,500/10,000). Since the payment period is ten years, the discount rate will be
based on a T-bond with the duration of fifty-five percent of years, or five point
five years. This step is necessary since T-bond principal is not repaid over the
term of the bond, like the secured claim will be under the plan. Therefore, the
court finds the yield on a five point five year T-bond, adds two percent and that is
the cram down rate. Id. at 868. Doud adopted the precise method proposed in
Carbiener, supra note 111.
149. In Doud, the court did allow the debtor to pay the contract rate on three loans
rather than a T-bond plus two percent rate, where the contract rates were lower.
The court found that use of the higher rate would thwart FmHA's goal to assist
farmers with low interest rate loans. In re Doud, 74 Bankr. 865, 871 (Bankr. S.D.
Iowa 1987).
150. 81 Bankr. 513 (Bankr. S.D. Iowa 1988).
151. Id. at 514.
152. The court believed that the lack of a trustee and the riskiness of the trucking
business of the reorganizing debtor justified a higher risk premium. Id. at 516.
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conforms to Monnier for the cram down of a secured creditor under
Section 1129(b)(2).154 The court stated that the use of the method
"should obviate the need for complex expert testimony" and that the
additional risk factor will satisfy the Eighth Circuit standards.55
2. Nebraska
Bankruptcy courts in Nebraska initially used a cram down rate
under which the creditor would receive the same rate of return under
the plan as it would from any borrower in a class similar to the debtor.
In re Scovill156 addressed the question of an appropriate discount rate
under Section 1325 on a secured claim held by a creditor on a car loan.
The court held that the creditor was entitled to the same rate it would
charge the debtor, as of the effective date of the plan, on a new loan on
the vehicle at issue in the case.157 The court reasoned that, while the
debtor was to receive a fresh start, he must be able to function nor-
mally in the existing economy; and, therefore, the borrower's rate on a
similar loan had to be paid under the plan.
In In re Paul,15S the court was asked to select an appropriate inter-
est rate to be paid under Section 1325 on arrearages under a home
mortgage. The parties submitted several rates for consideration.5 9
Following Scovill, the court held that the discount rate must be the
rate which a creditor would charge in the current market for the same
type of loan, rather than a rate based on T-bonds.160 However, in In re
Wichman,S1 Judge Mahoney changed gears and decided to adopt
Doud. Therefore, at least in the Chapter 12 context, and probably in
Chapters 11 and 13, Judge Mahoney will use a discount rate based on
T-bond yields with a risk factor added.162 The T-bond plus two per-
cent is presumed to be the appropriate discount rate unless it is totally
inappropriate because of special circumstances. The creditor can offer
evidence that a different rate should be used.163 However, under
Ultimately, the court awarded less than the T-bond plus 2.5 percent rate because,
amazingly, the creditor (the Internal Revenue Service) sought less than that rate.
153. 76 Bankr. 675 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1987).
154. Id. at 678.
155. Id.
156. 18 Bankr. 633 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1982).
157. Id. at 635.
158. 62 Bankr. 269 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1986).
159. The average T-bond rate was 7.97 percent, the contract rate was 15.75 percent, the
current thirty-year mortgage rate was 10.125 percent and the current rate for a
three-year loan (same duration as the plan payments) secured by real estate was
10.75 percent. Id. at 270.
160. Id. at 270-71. Therefore, the court selected the 10.75 percent rate.
161. 77 Bankr. 718 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1987).
162. Id. at 721-22.
163. Id. at 722.
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Wichman, exceptions to the use of the Doud formula probably will be
few.
Wichman adopted the Doud formula for several reasons. First,
the court cited the general worthlessness of expert testimony for set-
ting the discount rate. 164 Second, the Doud formula eliminates expert
testimony in most cases, saving time and money for the parties. For
these reasons, Judge Mahoney moved away from the rate the creditor
would charge on a similar loan in favor of the T-bond plus two percent
formula in Doud.165
In In re Milleson,166 Judge Minahan held that the Wichman
formula would not pay a creditor the present value of its secured claim
as required by Section 1225.167 Instead, the court found that the credi-
tor, a large agricultural lender, was entitled to the rate of interest it
was currently charging high-risk borrowers. The rate allowed was
higher than the rate dictated by Wichman. Milleson more closely re-
sembled the approach used in Scovill and Paul. But, the court did not
reject Wichman, stating instead that Wichman was inapplicable.
3. Missouri
At least one opinion in Missouri has adopted the Doud formula. In
In re Bartesmeyer,16 8 the court agreed generally with Doud that the
T-bond rate forms the basis of the interest rate on deferred payments
in Chapter 12.169 However, the court approved only a one-percent risk
premium, stating that the risk of unexpected depreciation is the only
basis on which to add a premium to the T-bond rate.170 Where there is
no likelihood of depreciation, the creditor will only be allowed a T-
bond rate.171
Bankruptcy courts in Iowa, Nebraska, and Missouri currently read
Monnier and Neil Pharmacal to allow a T-bond plus risk factor ap-
164. Id. at 720.
165. The Wichman formula was applied in In re E Bar V Angus Ranch Co., No. BK87-
801, slip op. (Bankr. D. Neb. Nov. 9, 1987).
166. 83 Bankr. 696 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1988).
167. Id. at 699.
168. 78 Bankr. 975 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1987).
169. Id. at 977.
170. Id.
171. Bartlesmeyer differs from the same court's view in Chapters 11 and 13. Missouri
courts had previously used the state legal rate as the cram down rate in those
contexts. See In re Johnston, 44 Bankr. 667 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1984); Matter of
Coburn, 36 Bankr. 550 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1983). In In re C & P Gray Farms, Inc.,
70 Bankr. 704 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1987), the court approved the use of the state
legal rate, even though the creditor argued that it could get a higher rate of inter-
est in the market. See also In re Fowler, No. 87-02970-SJ-13 (Bankr. W.D. Mo.
Aug. 9, 1988), where the court approved the use of the section 6621 rate because
the parties did not present evidence of the prevailing market rate. It is not yet
clear whether Bartlesmeyer will be applied to the Chapters 11 and 13 contexts.
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proach to deriving a plan discount rate. However, courts in North Da-
kota, Minnesota, and Arkansas use different methods, rejecting the T-
bond approach.172
4. North Dakota
North Dakota has developed a "creditor-specific" approach in set-
ting the appropriate discount rate. In In re CZaeys,173 the court ex-
pressly rejected the Doud formula as a means to establish a discount
rate in Chapter 12 because the method "seems arbitrary and unneces-
sary, particularly in those cases in which... a lender has introduced
testimony bearing on the very issue."17 4 The court found that Mon-
nier and Neil Pharmacal clearly require the court to consider what
the prevailing market rate would be for a loan of equal term and the
factor and the risks involved in such a loan. Therefore, "the best evi-
dence of what a discount rate ought to be is what a similar loan to a
debtor in similar circumstances would cost in the marketplace."175
Because "a creditor's own testimony as to what [rate] it would charge
for a loan under a given set of circumstances best reflects upon each of
the required inputs," the court set the discount rate at a rate only
slightly below what the creditor would have charge a one hundred
percent leveraged borrower. 7 6
C/aeys is consistent with other North Dakota opinions on deter-
mining a discount rate.17 7 The court has used the creditor-specific rate
to set the discount rate even where the creditor's rate is substantially
higher than other market rates, like T-bond yields. 7 8
5. Arkansas and Minnesota
Bankruptcy courts in Arkansas and Minnesota apparently agree
that a T-bond rate is not appropriate as a discount rate. For example,
in In re Landscape Associcates,179 the court stated that the "appropri-
ate rate of interest for calculating the present value of a claim is the
current market rate for a loan under similar circumstances."1 8 0 The
172. South Dakota is also in the Eighth Circuit. However, research has not uncovered
a South Dakota case addressing the discount rate issue.
173. 81 Bankr. 985 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1987).
174. Id. at 993.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 933-94.
177. See In re Konzak, 78 Bankr. 990 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1987)(Ctapter 12 must use rate
creditor would charge debtor in the market place absent bankruptcy as a discount
rate).
178. In In re Edwardson, 74 Bankr. 831 (Bankr. D. N.D. 1987), the court approved the
creditor's base rate on standard farm loans of twelve percent as the discount rate
under section 1225, even though T-bond rates were at 8.5 percent.
179. 81 Bankr. 485 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1987).
180. Id. at 487.
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court rejected the prime rate as found in the Wall Street Journal as
the appropriate discount rate.'8 ' Similarly, in construing Monnier,
the court in In re Citrowslce'8 2 stated "the interest rate which the
creditor involved would charge to the debtor in the present regular
loan market is presumptively the correct interest rate" for determin-
ing the discount rate under Section 1225.183
The courts in North Dakota, Arkansas, and Minnesota apparently
allow the particular creditor facing deferred payments of a secured
claim to set its own discount rate, consistent with other loans it is
making. In probably every case, this rate will be higher, maybe whole
percentage points higher, than the formula approach used in Iowa, Ne-
braska, and Missouri. 8 4 Yet, both lines of cases claim to be consistent
with Monnier and Neil Pharmacal.
D. What is the Correct Rate?
Even though bankruptcy courts in the Eighth Circuit have Mon-
nier and Neil Pharmacal as guidance, neither opinion gives much
assistance to bankruptcy courts when an actual discount rate must be
determined. This may account for the dissimilar methods used within
the circuit to determine the rate. Both methods used comply with the
vague language used by the court of appeals.
The court of appeals first requires that the discount rate be a "pre-
vailing market rate,"1 85 even though the confirmation sections of
Chapters 11, 12, and 13 do not so state. Also, the legislative history
refers to "the discount rate" rather than a market rate.18 6 Whether
there is, in fact, a real difference in the two concepts, is probably im-
material because courts generally agree that some market rate should
be used. The problem is which market rate.
The Doud line of cases adopts a market rate. This rate is respon-
181. Id. at 488. The debtor did not propose to add a risk factor in this case like the
method approved by Doud.
182. 72 Bankr. 613 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1987).
183. Id. at 617.
184. Agricultural lenders, even large lenders, will seldom charge less on a loan than
the T-bond yield plus a risk factor of around two percent. The largest lenders pay
no less than the prime lending rate for funds. The prime rate generally runs at or
above the yield on T-bonds. Therefore, unless the lender adds only two percent
to its cost of money when lending to a farmer, its lending rate will call for a
higher discount rate than the Doud formula. Naturally, smaller lenders will
charge even more on loans since they must pay more to obtain money; and, there-
fore, the discount rate on their secured claims would be even higher under the
creditor-specific approach.
185. See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
186. S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 414-15 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADmIN NEws 6370-71.
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sive to current economic conditions' 8 7 and is easy to calculate. 88
These conditions are recognized as common to all market rates.'8 9
The North Dakota line of cases-the creditor-specific approach-use
another type of market rate. The creditor-specific approach is respon-
sive to economic conditions-adjustments must be made by all credi-
tors to remain competitive or creditors risk losing money when rates
are rising or losing customers when rates are falling. The creditor-
specific rate is easy to determine by just asking the creditor. 90 There-
fore, both lines of cases meet the first test of Monnier and Neil
Pharmacal.
Second, bankruptcy courts must set a discount rate based on a loan
of a term equal to the payout period of the plan.191 The Doud formula
does this by utilizing a T-bond yield equal to the same percentage of
the repayment period as the average percentage of the claim outstand-
ing during the payments under the plan.'92 The creditor-specific ap-
proach satisfies this requirement by using the rate the creditor would
charge the debtor for a loan of the same duration as the payments
under the plan.
Third, there must be due consideration to the existence and quality
of the security and risk of subsequent default. 93 The "risk factor" of
Doud is meant to specifically compensate for these factors.194 Simi-
larly, the creditor-specific approach satisfies this test because, presum-
ably, these considerations are already loaded into the creditor's rates
that it would charge the debtor for a similar loan. 95
Finally, the discount rate must be determined on a case-by-case ba-
sis.'9 6 The creditor-specific approach obviously meets this test because
the particular creditor is required to show what rate it would cur-
rently charge the debtor on a similar loan. Doud, and especially Wich-
man, create a presumption that the T-bond plus two percent approach
will be used to establish the discount rate. Significantly, however,
each opinion left open the ability of a creditor to challenge the
formula rate and show why it was inappropriate. 97 Therefore, argua-
bly, the Doud line of cases allow for a modified case-by-case determi-
187. The auction method of selling treasury certificates may be one of the purest
forms of determining what the market will pay for the use of money.
188. Treasury bond yields are very easy to find in the financial section of most major
newspapers.
189. Carbiener, supra note 111, at 58-59.
190. Presumably, a court will require a creditor to justify its rate to ensure it is the
rate a debtor could get.
191. See supmr note 138 and accompanying text.
192. See supra note 146 and accompanying text; Carbiener, supra note 111, at 64-65.
193. See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
194. See In re Doud, 74 Bankr. 865, 869 (Bankr. S.D. Iowa 1988).
195. See In re Claeys, 81 Bankr. 985, 993 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1987).
196. See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
197. In re Doud, 74 Bankr. 865, 866 (Bankr. S.D. Iowa 1988). Interestingly, Wichman
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nation.198 Apparently, both formulas used by the Eighth Circuit
bankruptcy courts comply with Monnier and Neil Pharmacal. Is
there any compelling reason to use one over the other?
The Doud formula has two advantages over the creditor-specific
approach. First, application of the formula should save significant
amounts of court time and attorney fees because fewer hearings will
be necessary to determine the appropriate discount rate. In Wich-
man, Judge Mahoney indicated that the additional delay and expense
of the creditor-specific approach made such a method too burdensome
and sometimes useless.199 Second, the Doud formula offers an easy
way to determine the discount rate. The easy availability of a certain
rate is beneficial to both parties. The debtor and creditor save time
and money in arriving at a discount rate because no court hearing is
necessary. Also, a certain rate helps both parties evaluate the feasibil-
ity of a proposed plan.200 By having a certain discount rate to work
with, a proposed plan can address accurately whether the organization
is feasible because outlays under the plan will be more predictable.201
The creditor-specific method has been criticized as a method for
setting the discount rate for two reasons. First, most courts agree that
an appropriate discount rate should not include profit to the secured
creditor, finding instead that any profit should go to pay other claim-
ants.202 However, the creditor-specific rate does include some profit
for the creditor because it is the same rate the creditor would nor-
mally charge, and a creditor usually includes some profit premium in
the interest rate it charges.203 Second, creditor-specific rates also in-
clude premiums for other costs related to a lending transaction, such
as costs for borrower screening and delinquent loan collection. Be-
cause these costs arguably may be eliminated or reduced in bank-
ruptcy, a discount rate should not include premiums reflecting these
only addresses the fact that a creditor can challenge the formula rate. Hopefully,
the debtor will also be given the same privilege.
198. It remains a question as to how diligently the courts will follow the T-bond plus
two percent rate presumption and whether it can be challenged effectively.
199. In re Wichman, 77 Bankr. 718, 720 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1987). Judge Mahoney indi-
cated that testimony in hearings to set a discount rate may result in experts "con-
jur[ing] up" a discount rate.
200. There may be times where the redetermination of the discount rate may cause a
court to reject the plan and possibly dismiss the case. See In re Landscape As-
socs., 81 Bankr. 485 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1987). Adding certainty to the discount
rate determination will help to prevent such surprises.
201. Even if T-bond rates as of the confirmation date are used, a plan should be able to
be drawn up with a good idea as to what the rates will be.
202. See, e.g., In re Mitchell, 39 Bankr. 696 (Bankr. D. Or. 1984); In re Wilkinson, 33
Bankr. 933 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983); In re Fisher, 29 Bankr. 542 (Bankr. D. Kan
1983).
203. Carbiener, supra note 111, at 60.
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costs.2o4 The additional premiums for profit and costs of administra-
tion reflected in the creditor-specific rate are not present in the T-
bond yield rate.
Because both methods used seem to be consistent with Monnier
and Neil Pharmacal, the facts suggest that bankruptcy courts make a
decision as to who will bear the expense of bankruptcy-the expense
being the difference between the creditor-specific rate and the Doud
rate. Where a court is concerned with convenience and other credi-
tors, it should adopt the Doud formula. That formula is easy and less
expensive to apply and does not include a profit component for the
creditor holding the claim being paid down on a deferred basis. By
denying the creditor a profit premium under the plan, the creditor is
forced to forego a portion of the present value of its claim. If the cred-
itor had the money to lend as of the confirmation date, it could earn
this profit premium. Therefore, the creditor holding the claim bears
the cost of a more efficient process and increased payments to other
lower priority creditors.
If a court believes that the secured creditor is entitled to some
profit during the plan payment period, the creditor-specific approach
is most appropriate. Then a creditor actually could realize the entire
benefit of its claim under the plan. A profit premium loaded into the
discount rate would place the creditor in the same position as if it had
the claim amount to lend as of the confirmation date. Under the credi-
tor-specific approach, the debtor and other creditors incur the expense
of this profit premium payment to the secured creditor.
Currently, the bankruptcy courts are equally divided, in terms of
jurisdictions, as to which method should be used. Both methods seem
justified under the current Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals' opinions.
However, because significant differences may exist in the discount
rates arrived at using the alternative methods, the court of appeals
should step in and finally clarify the issue.
V. CONCLUSION
Getting interest on a claim in the context of bankruptcy is re-
stricted to a select group of creditors. All creditors are allowed to as-
sert a claim for pre-petition matured interest. However, once a
petition is filed, the interest clock is turned off. Only creditors with
oversecured consensual liens are assured of interest during the gap
period. In some jurisdictions, oversecured nonconsensual liens also ac-
crue gap period interest. When gap period interest is allowed, it be-
comes part of the secured claim to the extent of any equity cushion.
All secured claims paid on a deferred basis pursuant to a plan of
reorganization are entitled to post-confirmation interest. However,
204. Id. at 61.
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the methods to determine the appropriate post-confirmation rate vary
a great deal.
Todd W. Ruskamp '88
